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NOTE
PROSPECTIVITY AND RETROACTIVITY OF SUPREME
COURT CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS
The freedom of a court, state or federal, to define the limits of ad-
herence to precedent has been sanctioned by the Supreme Court in
both civil' and criminal2 cases. Accordingly, any decision can be made
to apply to future cases or relate back to all past cases. In no other area
of the law is such a decision more important than in the field of crim-
inal procedure where the freedom of a convicted man can rest upon a
decision to apply a new "rule" retroactively or prospectively. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the majority of retroactivity cases involve
the rights of a criminal defendant.
Since the United States Constitution "has no voice" 3 on the subject
of retroactivity, any court has a wide range of possible limitations it
may adopt as to the applicability of a given decision. At one extreme
is a completely retroactive rule, which applies the new "rule" to all
past as well as future cases. On the other hand, a purely prospective
rule does not even apply to the parties before the court, but only to
future cases. In between these extremes there are any number of limited
retroactive or prospective rules which a court can adopt. The Supreme
Court occupies a unique position in regard to retroactivity decisions in
that Article III of the United States Constitution requires the Court to
decide only cases and controversies. This precludes purely prospective
rulings because such decisions would be mere dictum.4 Therefore, a
Supreme Court prospective rule must apply to the parties before the
1 Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
2 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
3 Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932).
4See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967); Bickel, Foreward: The Passive
Virtues, The Supreme Court, 1960 Ter, 75 HARv. L. Rrv. 40, 42 (1961); Comment,
Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YAr L.J.
907, 930-33 (1962). However, some authorities have reasoned that prospective over-
ruling is permissible under article I because it merely adds a potentially dispositive
issue to a justiciable case. Article III just requires federal courts to deal with disposi-
rive issues, which may be potentially dispositive as well as dispositive in fact. See
Currier, Time and Change in judge Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REv.
201, 220 (1965); 1B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcricE 0.A02 [3.-2-3], at 191 (2d ed. 1965).
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Court and to all future cases which have not proceeded beyond a point
established by the Court.5
The wide range of possibilities and the lack of precedent for such
decisions demonstrates the arbitrary and pragmatic nature of prospective
rulings. The legislative character of the decisions plus an inability to
rationalize one case with another has also contributed to criticism of
the Court from commentators, as well as members of the Court itself,
in its handling of the important problem of the retroactivity of a new
criminal "rule."
I. THE HISTORICAL, SETTING OF RETROACTIVITY
The traditional view adhered to for many centuries was that of Black-
stone: a judge's duty is not to "pronounce new law, but to maintain
and expound the old one." ' The court's function, therefore, is to de-
clare what the law has always been and not what it is to be in the future.
The latter is the function of a legislative body.
A retreat from traditional retroactive application began with the legis-
lative divorce7 and municipal bond' cases, where the injustice of com-
plete retroactivity is obvious. Even early in the criminal field the retro-
activity of certain new decisions was found injudicious.9 These cases
forecast the rise of the realist school which espoused the belief that
judges are really makers of law. Contrary to Blackstonian principles,
overruled precedents were once valid and were justifiably relied upon
for a certain period of time.1° Despite the popularity of the realist view,
retroactivity is far from a dead doctrine and is applied to new rulings in
proper cases. Retroactivity has survived attacks that it violates the Con-
5 For example, in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), it was held that
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), were applicable only to cases where the trial had begun after the latter two
decisions were handed down.
0 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 69 (1769). See also Norton v. Shelby County, 118
U.S. 425 (1886).
7 Bingham v. Miller, 17 Ohio 445 (1848).
8 Gelpecke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863).
9 State v. Simanton, 100 Mont. 292, 49 P.2d 981 (1935); State v. Bell, 136 N.C. 674,
49 S.E. 163 (1904); State v. Jones, 44 N.M. 623, 107 P.2d 324 (1940).
'OSee Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037 (1961);
Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1960);
Schaeffer, The Control of "Sunbursts": Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42
N.Y.U.L. Rav. 631 (1967).
[Vol. 5: 129
19701 CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS-
stitution," impairs contractual obligations,'2 or creates an ex post facto
law.18 In addition, retroactivity has been held not to deny due process14
or equal protection. 15
Even though the power of a state court to adopt a prospective rule
has been sanctioned for almost four decades,i' the power of a federal
court to do the same was not firmly recognized until recently.1 The
expanded rights of the criminal defendant beginning with Mapp v.
Ohio'8 and the expanded scope of federal habeas corpus relief under
Fay v. Noia'9 have caused during the last decade2 an onslaught of
cases, mostly habeas corpus, which have succinctly brought the issue
before the Court. By far the largest number of cases to raise the ques-
tion of prospectivity or retroactivity are in the field of criminal pro-
cedure.2'
At the beginning of the last decade, a prisoner on habeas corpus
could only raise issues which had been raised previously at his trial
and decided adversely to him. Now a habeas petitioner in most cases
can attack his final conviction successfully even though the new rule
could not have been raised at his trial or on appeal.22 After Fay v. Noij
many prisoners sought to take advantage of new constitutional principles
laid down, in some instances, many years after their convictions had be-
"lLindetter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil
& Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
12 Fleming v. Fleming, 264 U.S. 29 (1924); Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444
(1924); Moore-Mansfield Constr. Co. v. Electrical Installation Co., 234 U.S. 619
(1914); Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U.S. 103 (1895).
13 Fleming v. Fleming, 264 U.S. 29 (1924); Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S.
444 (1924); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915); Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150
(1913); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S.
(3 Dal].) 386 (1798).
14 Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444 (1924); Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159
U.S. 103 (1895).
'5Sunray Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 962 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
861 (1945).
16 Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil and Refining Co, 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
1T Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
Is 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
19 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
20 Between Sunburst and Linkletter the Supreme Court expressly dealt with retro-
activity in the criminal field only once. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961)
(embezzled money as taxable income).21 See Annot., 22 L. Ed. 2d 821 (1970).
22 Fay v. Nola, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S.
217 (1969).
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come final. Accordingly, the Supreme Court was called upon to estab-
lish a set of principles to be used in deciding whether or not a new
"rule" of criminal procedure deserved retroactive or prospective ap-
plication.
II. LINKLETTER TO DESIST: RETROACTIVE CRITERIA AND
PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION
The retroactive application of the new "rules" of criminal procedure
was expressly dealt with by the Supreme Court for the first time in
Linkletter v. Walker.23 This far reaching opinion laid down the criteria
for the determination of the retroactive or prospective application of
a given criminal decision. Linkletter and subsequent retroactivity cases
demonstrate how the Court has chosen to apply its retroactive criteria
and how different rules of prospective application have developed.
Linkletter had been convicted in Louisiana for burglary by evidence
that would have been excluded under the rule of Mapp v. Ohio.24 How-
ever, his conviction had become final25 before Mapp was decided. The
Supreme Court ruled that Mapp was not entitled to retroactive ap-
plication and accordingly denied Linkletter habeas corpus relief. Fol-
lowing Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co.,20 the Court
reasoned that the Constitution did not prohibit either a retroactive or
a prospective rule,27 and that there is no distinction between civil and
criminal proceedings as to retroactivity. 28 Observing that previously
without discussion new constitutional rules had been applied to convic-
tions already final,29 the Court set forth the threefold criteria to be
considered in determining the retroactivity of a given decision:
2 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
24 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
25 "By final we mean where the judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability
of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari had elapsed before our
decision in Mapp v. Ohio." Linidetter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 n. 5 (1965).
26 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
27 Linldetter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 626 (1965). See also Chicot County Drainage
Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940).
28 See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v.
Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 103 (1801).
29 Arthur v. Colorado, 380 U.S. 250 (1965); McNerlin v. Denno, 378 U.S. 575
(1964); Doughty v. Max-well, 376 U.S. 202 (1964); Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375
U.S. 2 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Rech v. Pate, 367 U.S.
433 (1961); Eskridge v. Washington, 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
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... we must look to the purpose of the Mapp rule; the reliance placed
upon the Wolf doctrine; and the effect on the administration of justice
of a retrospective application of Mapp.30
The Court decided that the primary purpose of the Mapp rule was a
deterrent to lawless police actionY1 This indicated a prospective rule be-
cause the proscribed conduct had already occurred and reparation for
the defendant's ruptured privacy came "too late". 32 The strong reliance
by the police on Wolf v. Colorado,3 3 which refused to apply an ex-
clusionary rule for illegally seized evidence in state courts, weighed
heavily in the Court's prospective decision. Also a retroactive applica-
tion of Mapp would "tax the administration of justice to the utmost",34
because evidence may have been lost, witnesses may not be available, or
memories may have dimmed. With all three criteria indicating a pro-
spective ruling, the Court held that Mapp applied only to prisoners
whose convictions were not yet final at the time Mapp was decided.35
Following the lead of Linkletter, other prisoners sought to have their
convictions reviewed on the basis of cases decided after their convic-
tions had become final. In Teban v. United States ex rel. Shott,36 the peti-
tioner had been convicted for a violation of the Ohio Securities Act at a
trial in which the prosecutor commented extensively upon the peti-
tioner's refusal to testify. Such adverse comment was later held to vio-
late the privilege against compulsory self incrimination in Griffin v.
California,17 which was decided after Shott's conviction became final.
Shott argued that the privilege against self incrimination "went to the
fairness of the trial-the very integrity of the fact-finding process," 38
hence a retroactive rule was indicated under the criteria of Linkletter.
The Court disagreed though it felt Griffin had no distinct purpose
as Mapp had. The basic purposes of Griffin relate to the preservation
S0 Linldetter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965) (emphasis added).
31 Id. at 637.
32Id.
33 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
34 Linldetter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965).
3 5 It is an established principle that any accused is entitled to the benefit of a new
ruling while his case is on appeal. United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
103, 110 (1801). Therefore, in the context of a prospective ruling, it is logical to deny
application of a new "rule" to those prisoners whose convictions have become final.
30 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
37 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
38 Linldetter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965).
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of the integrity of the judicial system and not to the ascertainment of
truth. The great reliance by the state on a contrary rule for more than
50 years39 and the great number of cases that may be retried indicated
a prospective ruling. Accordingly, the Court held Griffin applied only
to convictions not yet final when Griffin was decided, therefore Shott
was also denied habeas corpus relief.
It was inevitable that the retroactivity of the Supreme Court's two
best known decisions in the realm of criminal procedure would come
before the Court. In Johnson v. New Jersey40 the convictions of two
prisoners based upon confessions which would have been invalid under
Escobedo v. Illionis4 1 and Miranda v. Arizona42 standards had become
final four years before the former case was decided. The Court was
faced with the problem of a new "rule" that had purposes relating to
both the right to counsel and the privilege against self incrimination.
Even though not expressly held by the Court, Gideon v. Wainwright43
and other right to counsel cases had been given complete retroactive
application, 44 whereas Tehan had shown the privilege against self in-
crimination cases would be given prospective application. Miranda and
Escobedo were held to fall primarily into the second category. A strong
39 The strong view of Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), which denied
application of the privilege against self-incriminiation to the states, had been upheld many
times by the Court until expressly overruled in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
40 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
41378 U.S. 478 (1964).
42 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
43 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
44See Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 5 (1968); McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S.
2 (1968). Many lower federal courts have held Gideon retroactive. See, e.g., Rini v.
'Katzenbach, 403 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1968); Davis v. Holman, 354 F.2d 773 (5th Cir.
1965); Shawan v. Cox, 350 F.2d 909 (10th Cir. 1965); Berryhill v. Page, 349 F.2d 984
(10th Cir. 1965); Williams v. Alabama, 341 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1965); In re Parker. 297
F. Supp. 367 (D.S.D. 1969); Cuevas v. Wilson, 264 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Cal. 1966);
Jedby v. Swenson, 261 F. Supp. 209 (W.D. Mo. 1966); Brown v. Heize, 248 F. Supp.
293 (N.D. Cal. 1965); Bird v. Sigler, 241 F. Supp. 1007 (D. Neb.), aft'd, 354 F.2d 694
(8th Cir. 1964). The Supreme Court has also applied Gideon retroactively without
discussion. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967); Arthur v. Colorado, 380 U.S. 250
(1965); Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1964); Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375
U.S. 2 (1963).
Also, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), which upheld the right to counsel
on appeal has been applied retroactively. Bosler v. Swenson, 363 F.2d 154 (8th Cir.
1966); In re Parker, 297 F. Supp. 367 (D.S.D. 1969); United States ex rel. Sliva v.
Rundle, 295 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Donnell v. Swenson, 258 F. Supp. 317
(W.D. Mo. 1966); United States ex rel. Michell v. Fay, 241 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
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reliance argument, a serious disruptive effect on the administration
of justice, the ability of pre-Escobedo and pre-Miranda prisoners to
avail themselves of the voluntariness test caused the Court to apply a
prospective rule. Most significant in this ruling was a shift from a
finality of conviction criteria for applying the new "rule" to a trial
date rule45 whereby only those defendants whose trials had begun after
Miranda and Escobedo were decided could take advantage of them.
The next major decision in the area of retroactivity of a new crim-
inal "rule" came with the lineup cases, United States v. Wade46 and Gil-
bert v. California.47 In Stovall v. Denno 4 the right to counsel rule at
post-indictment confrontations for identification purposes was held to
apply only to lineups or other confrontations occurring after Wade and
Gilbert were decided. Stovall sought review of his final conviction which
was based upon a pre trial confrontation in the absence of counsel at
which he was identified as the perpetrator of a brutal attack upon an
elderly couple. Even though right to counsel cases are usually held
retroactive, the Court felt that the reliability of the fact-finding process
argument was outweighed in this case by the great reliance on a dif-
ferent rule by the police and the serious disruptive effect a retroactive
rule would have on the administration of justice. Accordingly, Wade
and Gilbert were held to apply only to cases involving confrontations
for identification purposes conducted in the absence of counsel after
the date of the two decisions. Again it is noteworthy that the Court
shifted from a trial date rule in Johnson to the date of the alleged vio-
lation as the criteria for determining who may take advantage of Wade
and Gilbert.
Considering the similar nature of a lineup without counsel and elec-
tronic eavesdropping without a warrant, it is not surprising that the
Supreme Court applied a violation date rule to Katz v. United States,49
which held such eavesdropping is an intrusion, a search and seizure,
4 5 Professor Johnson has designated the three different rules that the Court has used
as trial date rule, final judgment rule, and zdolation date rule. The first applies the
new "rule" only to cases where the trial has not yet commenced when the new "rule"
is announced. The second allows application of the new "rule" only to cases on direct
review. The third holds that only the proscribed conduct occurring after the new
"rule" is handed down is affected. Johnson, Foreword; The Supreme Court of
California, 1967-1968, 56 CA~ip. L. Rsdv. 1612, 1613 (1968).
46 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
47 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
48 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
49 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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and, therefore, a warrant must first be obtained. In Desist v. United
States,50 the defendant had been convicted of conspiring to import and
conceal heroin. The incriminating evidence was obtained prior to the
Katz ruling by federal agents who had, without a warrant, taped a
microphone to a door of Desist's hotel room. In failing to overturn the
defendant's conviction, Katz was held to apply "only to cases in which
the prosecution seeks to introduce the fruits of electronic surveillance
conducted after December 18, 1967". 51 A strong reliance by the police
on the old trespassory eavesdropping rule and the deterrent effect of
Katz weighed heavily in the Court's decision. Noting that the retro-
activity or prospectivity of Katz was an open question, the Court felt
it was not bound to adopt a final conviction rule as it had done for
Mapp and Griffin because the latter decisions had been applied to cases
on direct review even before the Supreme Court ruled them to be pro-
spective. Considering previous cases, Desist is not noteworthy. However,
its three vigorous dissents demonstrate the uneasiness of the Court over
the present state of the law regarding retroactivity of new "rules" of
criminal procedure.
The Supreme Court has dealt with the retroactivity of most of these
new "rules" by explicit decisions. However, the landmark right to coun-
sel decision of Gideon v. Wainwrigh52 has been given complete retro-
active application by the Supreme Court without discussion,5 3 and its
retroactivity has been recognized in dictum in later cases.54 Jackson v.
Denno,55 which held that the question of voluntariness of a confession
could not be submitted to a jury, was applied retroactively without
discussion by the Supreme Court in McNerlin v. Denno.56 One of the
earliest cases setting forth a new criminal "rule," Griffin v. Illinois,57
was applied retroactively again without discussion, in Eskridge v.
Washington Prison Board.58 Lower federal court reports are ripe with
50 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
51 Id. at 254.
52 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
5a See cases cited note 44 supra.
54 See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393
U.S. 5 (1968); McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384
U.S. 719 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
55 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
56 378 U.S. 575 (1964).
57 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right of indigent to free transcript of his trial for appellate
purposes).
58 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
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decisions as to the retroactivity or prospectivity of important Supreme
Court criminal decisions upon which the Court itself has not ruled,
such as Benton v. Maryland,59 Boykin v. Alabama,10 Cbimel v. Cali-
fornia,61 North Carolina v. Pearce,"2 United States v. Jackson, 3 and
Massiah v. United States. 4 The retroactivity of some of these cases is
presently pending before the Court and decisions can be expected this
term. The retroactivity of a given decision is usually determined by
a later case because the Court hesitates in directing itself toward the
issue in the case setting down the new "rule". One notable exception
is Witherspoon v. Illinois60 dealing with exclusion of a juror because
59395 US. 784 (1969), held retroactive in Galloway v. Beto, 421 F.2d 284 (5th Cir.
1970); Booker v. Phillips, 418 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1969), petition for cert. filed, 38
U.S..W. 3280 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1970) (No. 1075), and Day v. Copinger, 307 F. Supp.
201 (D. Md. 1969). The Supreme Court last term expressly held Benton to be
retroactive Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
6o 395 U.S. 238 (1969), held prospective in United States ex rel. Hughes v. Rundle,
419 F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Russell, 309 F. Supp. 125
(E.D. Pa. 1970); United States ex rel. Beecham v. Rundle, 306 F. Supp. 904 (ED.
Pa. 1969); Arbuckle v. Turner, 306 F. Supp. 825 (D. Utah 1969); Bishop v. Sharkey,
306 F. Supp. 246 (D.R.T. 1969); Quillien v. Leeke, 303 F. Supp. 698 (D.S.C. 1969);
United States ex rel. Wiggins v Pennsylvania, 302 F Supp. 845 (ED. Pa. 1969).
61395 U.S. 752 (1969), held prospective in Porter v. Ashmore, 421 F.2d 1186 (4th
Cir. 1970), petition for cert. filed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3357 (U.S. March 12, 1970) (No. 1310);
United States v. Blassick, 422 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1970); Williams v. United States,
418 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1969), review granted, 38 U.S.L.W. 3366 (U.S. March 24, 1970)
(No. 1125); Lyon v. United States, 416 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Bennett, 415 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1969); Jordan v. United States, 416 F.2d 338 (9th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970); United States v. Frazier, 304 F. Supp. 467
(D. Md. 1969); New York ex rel. Muhammad v. Mancusi, 301 F. Supp. 1100
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
62 393 U.S. 922 (1968), held retroactive in United States v. Coke, 404 F.2d 836 (2d
Cir. 1968).
63 390 U.S. 570 (1968), held retroactive in Shaw v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 824
(S.D. Ga. 1969), but held prospective in Pindell v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 751
(D. Conn. 1969) and United States ex rel. Buttcher v. Yeager, 288 F. Supp. 906
(D.NJ. 1968).
04377 U.S. 201 (1964), held prospective in United States ex rel. Long v. Pate, 418
F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Allison v. New Jersey, 418 F.2d 332
(3d Cir. 1969); Milton v. Wainwright, 306 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Fla. 1969).
05 See, e.g., United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 394 U.S.
957 (1969), restored to calendar for reargument, 396 U.S. 1035 (1970) (involving
Katz v. United States); Marchese v. United States, 411 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1969),
petition for cert. filed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3078 (U.S. Aug. 8, 1969) (No. 444) (involving
Katz v. United States); Moon v. Maryland, 250 Md. 468, 243 A.2d 564 (1968), cert.
granted, 395 U.S. 975 (1969) (involving Pearce v. North Carolina).
106 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
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of his beliefs on capital punishment. There the court held the new
rule to be retroactive, even though this facet of the decision was only
important enough to warrant a footnote. 7
From a survey of Supreme Court decisions referred to above, several
general observations can be made as to the handling of a retroactivity
problem by the Court. The purpose to be served by the new "rule"
is the foremost consideration of the Court."" If the purpose cannot be
readily ascertained, then the other two criteria will govern the result 9
with the reliance argument the most persuasive. The disruptive effect
on the administration of justice will easily give way if the purpose of
the "rule" clearly indicates a retroactive ruling.70 Passing to the criteria
of the Court in establishing who may take advantage of a new "rule",
more arbitrariness and less adherence to precedent is evident. Given
the criteria established by the Court, it is much easier to predict whether
or not a given case will be held prospective or retroactive than to
predict whether a trial date, final conviction, violation, or some other
new rule will be adopted if prospective application is indicated.7'
III. SOME OBSERVATIONS AND CRITICISM
Assuming arguendo the validity of the criteria adopted by the Su-
preme Court in Linkletter and in subsequent cases, one cannot help
but be impressed by the incongruities that are apparent in the applica-
tion of those rules. Even a brief survey of the problems that are raised
show that Justice Harlan was correct when he said, "'Retroactivity'
must be rethought." 72
A. Retroactivity and Habeas Corpus
The expanded scope and utilization of federal habeas corpus has
complicated the question of retroactivity. By virtue of a series of cases
from Fay v. Noia78 to Kaufman v. United States,74 a prisoner can now
67 Id. at 523 n. 22.
18 See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249 (1969); Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S.
293, 295 (1968); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 523 n.22 (1968).
69 See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
70 See right to counsel cases in note 44 supra.
71 For a discussion of the difficulty experienced by the Supreme Court of California
in attempting to predict how the United States Supreme Court would rule on the
retroactivity of Escobedo see Johnson, supra note 45, at 1623.
72 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
78 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
74 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
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contest his detention on the basis of new "rules" that were handed
down long after his conviction became final.75 Shortly after Linkletter
was decided, Professor Mishkin attempted to explain how the function
of habeas corpus could decide a retroactivity problem. 76 Habeas corpus
is used to assure an innocent man against a wrongful conviction.77
Therefore, Mishkin reasoned that new "rules" could not be used on
habeas review unless the reliability of the evidence used for conviction was
involved.78 This view corresponded with the Supreme Court's pro-
nouncement in Linkletter that retroactivity was dictated when the new
"rule" related to the reliability of the fact-finding process.79 However,
it has been pointed out that habeas corpus is used to attack more than
procedural due process. The fact that substantive rules of law can be
raised demonstrates the weakness of Mishkin's theory that the function
of habeas corpus will decide any retroactivity issue. Similarly, the Su-
preme Court's purpose determination, which is designed to deal with
procedural questions, would be inadequate in deciding a substantive
issue. 0 Mishkin's theory causes more problems than a complete retro-
active rule, especially if the new "rules" are considered to be mere
"reflections of principles of 'ordered liberty' fundamental to our legal
system." 81
Justice Harlan's dissent in Desist is a penetrating critique of retro-
activity and habeas corpus.82 The new federal habeas corpus serves
two principle functions. First, it insures that no man has been tried
under a procedure which created a risk that an innocent person may
have been convicted. By logical deduction any new decision that re-
lates to the reliability of the fact-finding process should be used on
75 Id. at 228. For the history of federal habeas corpus see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
399-426, 449-63 (1963); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners, 76 HAuv. L. REv. 441 (1963); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of
an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1315 (1961). See also 28 U.S.C.
§2241 c) (3) (1964).
76 Mishldn, Foreward: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of
Time and Law; The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HAv. L. REv. 56 (1965). See also
Meador, Habeas Corpus and the "Retroactivity" Illusion, 50 VA. L. REv. 1115 (1964).
77See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).78 Mishkln, supra note 76, at 79-86.
79 V. LocxArT, Y. Kmsml, & J. Ckopem, CONsTrruONAL LAW 713 (2d. ed. 1967).8OSchwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to Professor
Mishkin, 33 U. Cm. L. REv. 719, 723-46 (1966).
Sl Id. at 757.
82 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 255-69 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
1970J
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [
habeas corpus review. However, the second function, seeing that all
courts follow established constitutional standards in all their proceed-
ings, indicates that it is not necessary to apply all new "rules" retro-
actively. The reviewing court need only apply the law prevailing at
the time the petitioner was convicted.8 3
Determining exactly what the law was at that time is not an easy
task. Any "rule" could be genuinely new or it could be just another
manifestation of long established constitutional principles. Given the
set of facts that prompted the new "rule," no one can be assured that
the Court would have ruled differently at the time the petitioner was
convicted.8 This is closely related to the "foreshadowing" principle
announced in Johnson v. New Jersey:
As for the standards laid down.. . in Miranda, if we were persuaded
that they had been fully anticipated by the holding in Escobedo, we
would measure their prospectivity from the same date.84
The "same date" referred to is the date of Escobedo. This principle was
the main thrust of Justice Fortas' dissent in Desist,86 that is, that Katz
was foreshadowed at least as far back as Silverman v. United States,8T
hence its retroactivity should be measured at least from the date of
Silverman.
Justice Harlan did not speak so much in terms of "foreshadowing,"
but more as to the exact state of the law at the time of conviction.
For instance, Wade and Gilbert applied the right to counsel at a lineup,
a critical stage of the proceedings. Similarly, custodial interrogations
under Miranda and Escobedo were held to be critical stages. One day
after Escobedo a Court reading Escobedo could have anticipated the
same kind of ruling in a lineup case before the Supreme Court.88
Likewise, a strong argument can be made that any court, after reading
Linkletter, would have used a final conviction rule in other cases
involving one of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights incorporated into
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.89 Determining
83M. at 263.
84 Id. at 264.
85 384 U.S. 719, 734 (1966).
86 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 269-79 (1969) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
87365 U.S. 505 (1961).
88 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 267-68 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 266.
Vol. 5:129
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS
the law on habeas corpus at any given time is not as easy as it first
appears. Therefore, any solution of a retroactivity problem on the basis
of the function of habeas corpus is not free of difficulty.
B. "Similarly Situated Defendants' and Fortuitous Circumstances
Article HI of the United States Constitution requires the Supreme
Court to "resolve issues solely in concrete cases or controversies." 90
Therefore, any new ruling must be applied to the parties before the
Court in order to avoid dictum.9 1 This creates situations where some
"similarly situated defendants" have the benefit of the new decision
while it is denied to others. 2 The most notorious example of such a
"pick and choose" 9 3 technique is Miranda, where only four out of
eighty similar cases were selected for decision. 4 This meant that the
other seventy-six were denied relief under the prospective ruling of
Johnson. This is a departure from the time honored tradition that
all "similarly situated defendants" should be entitled to the same relief
unless there is some "principled reason for acting differently." - -
Whenever the Supreme Court adopts a prospective rule, the availi-
bility of such rule to a convicted pirsoner is a matter of chance. Any
lower court system which quickly brings cases to a conclusion hinders
a prisoner's chance of success in the future, especially when a final
judgment rule applies. Mr. Linkletter was a victim of such a court
system. Even though he committed his crime about nine months after
Miss Mapp's offense, his Louisiana conviction became final a year before
Mapp was decided. This, in effect, penalized Linkletter for having
committeed a crime in a state which speedily handled its case load. The
Constitution gives an accused a right to a speedy trial,90 but the Su-
preme Court has by such rulings as Linkletter and Johnson put a pr -
mium on delayed, 'protracted criminal prosecutions.9 7 The Supreme
90 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967). See also Comment, Prospective Over-
ruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 930-33
(1962).
91 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967).
02 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
03 Id. at 259.
94Besides Miranda v. Arizona, other cases decided were Vignera v. New Fork,
Westover v. United States, and California v. Stewart. See Desist v. United States,
394 U.S. 244, 255 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Johnson, supra note 71, at 1621."",
05 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 259 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
90 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
97 See Johnson, supra note 45, at 1631.
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Court has rationalized this whole situation "as an insignificant cost for
adherence to sound principles of decision-making." "' Chance bene-
ficiaries, according to the Court, are necessary to avoid the cases and
controversy sanction of article III and to encourage attorneys to advo-
cate a change in the law." This is thin reasoning, at most, to a habeas
corpus petitioner.
C. Judicial Legislation
The ad hoc character of retroactivity cases is patently obvious.'
Line drawing is traditionally a matter for the legislature.' Statutes can
make certain acts, including police procedure, legitimate one day and
illegal the next. When the Supreme Court rules that after a certain
date electronic eavesdropping without a warrant is impermissible, it is
doing by decision what legislatures do by statute. Much to the dismay
of the Blackstonians, it is nowhere more obvious than in retroactivity
cases than judges do make law. The legislative nature of such rulings
has been severely criticized by members of the Court itself, as in the
following comment by Justice Black:
I think this doctrine of prospective-only application is nothing less
than judicial amendment of the Constitution, since it results in the
Constitution's meaning one thing the day prior to a particular decision
and something entirely different the next day even though the language
remains the same. Under our system of government such amendments
can not constitutionally be made by judges, but only by the action
of Congress and the people.102
Justice Harlan has expressed the matter in terms of the difference be-
tween legislative and judicial duties:
... it is the task of this Court, like that of any other, to do justice
to each litigant on the merits of his own case. It is only if each of
our decisions can be justified in terms of this fundamental premise
98 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967).
99 Id.
110D See Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 224 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Com-
ment, Constitutional Law-Retroactivity of Constitutional Decisions, 44 N.C.L. REv.
1096 (1966).
101 See Currier, supra note 4, at 226-28.
lO2DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28, 34 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
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that they may properly be considered the legitimate products of a
court of law, rather than the commands of a super-legislature.
03
Another expression of the legislative character of the decisions is the
arbitrary shifting of the cut-off point. 04 The Court has held that "there
are no jurisprudential or constitutional obstacles" 105 to such a change.
This is a simple matter of line drawing-a legislative function. Instead
of using the purpose criteria just to decide the retroactivity of a new
decision, the Court should use this standard in establishing the cut-off
point. The final judgment rule set up for Mapp by Linkletter cor-
responds to the traditional role of an appellate court in applying the
law as it stands on appeal.1 6 This role is retreated from in the trial
date rules for Escobedo and Miranda. Retreat is even more pronounced
in the violation date rules established for Wade and Katz. Such rules
present incongruities. Mapp and Katz are both held to be deterrents
to illegal police conduct, yet the former has a final judgment rule, the
latter, a violation date rule. Griffin v. California proscribed adverse
comment at trial by judge or prosecutor, and Miranda and Escobedo
sought to defer the obtaining of illegal confessions, but the former has
a final judgment rule, the latter, a trial date rule.0 7 Any legal officer
cannot be sure some conduct will be proscribed by the Supreme Court
until it so decides. That conduct is considered a violation of some con-
stitutional principle only after the decision is handed down. There-
fore, the act should be emphasized in deciding what cut-off point to
apply. 08 Even this view lends itself to difficulty when one tries to de-
cide whether the proscribed conduct in Escobedo and Miranda was
the way the confessions were obtained or the admissibility of them at
trial. If the former controlled, then a violation date and not a trial date
rule was indicated.'09 It is characteristic of any prospective rule that
some deficiency is forthcoming.
103Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 259 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
104The cut-off point is that point in the proceedings against an accused who is
seeking to take advantage of a new "rule," after which he can not avail himself of
that ruling.
105 Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733 (1966). See Johnson, supra note 71, at
1621.
100 See note 35 supra.
107 W. LocKmATr, supra note 79, at 715; Johnson, supra note 45, at 1622.
1 0 8 See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967).
109 See W. LocxiAxr, supra note 79, at 715.
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Not only is arbitrariness shown in the cut-off points, but also in the
criteria used by the Court to decide the purpose of any new rule. The
rights of other "similarly situated defendants" will be ignored in order
to deter impermissible police conduct or prevent a burden on the ad-
ministration of justice.110 It is little solace to the man in prison that
reparation for his ruptured privacy by illegal police conduct comes
too late."' On the other hand, a prisoner has little to worry about if
the Court holds that the new rule of which he seeks to take advantage
has the purpose of prevention of a chance that an innocent man has
been convicted. The label of retroactivity, therefore, has the power
to make one constitutional right more valuable than another."' A com-
parison of Fay v. Noia and Linkletter v. Walker demonstrates how
much more valuable the right not to be coerced into a confession is
than the right to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures.
A legislature is free to change the law as it sees fit and is not bound
by rules of precedent, as is a court. A court should follow the rules
it has laid down previously for determination of a particular type of
case. The Supreme Court, in a manner similar to a lawmaking body,
has on occasion refused to follow its own rules in determining a retro-
activity case. This is strikingly apparent in the "foreshadowing" cases
referred to previously. The Court in Desist refused to follow such a
principle when it applied a prospective rule to Katz, a case anticipated
as early as 1961. This departure is even more remarkable considering
Berger v. California,"3 decided two months before Desist, where it
was held that Barber v. Page"4 was fully retroactive. It was found
that "California's claim of significant countervailing interest based upon
its reliance on previous standards . . . is most unpersuasive. Barber v.
Page was clearly foreshadowed, if not preordained, by this Court's de-
cision in Pointer v. Texas. .. ." "' Even though Berger allowed com-
plete retroactivity, it does show that the Court had very recently con-
sidered the "foreshadowing" idea. The Supreme Court should not be
"Io See Linkletter v. Valker, 381 U.S. 618, 648 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
"'- Id. at 652.
12 Id. at 646. The Supreme Court has said, however, that the retroactivity of a new
decision "in no way turns on the value of the constitutional guarantee involved" and
"is not automatically determined by the provision of the Constitution on which the
dictate is based." Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728 (1966).
11" 393 U.S. 314 (1969).
"14 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
116 Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969).
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any more loathe to establish a partial retroactivity rule than to set up
various cut off points in prospective rulings, which it has done.116 Justice
Fortas would have allowed a partially retroactive rule for Desist in
light of what was said in Johnson."l 7
Closely related is the situation in DeBacker v. Brainard"' where the
Court hid behind the facade of the prospective ruling to avoid deciding
whether or not a jury trial is required in juvenile hearings. DeStefano
v. Woods" °0 held Duncan v. Louisianad° and Bloom 'v. Illinois'2l to be
prospective only. Therefore, since the petitioner's juvenile hearing oc-
curred before the latter two cases were decided, he would not be en-
tided to a jury trial, even if he were an adult. By a twist of fate De-
Backer missed by only two months having an important issue decided
that the Court will eventually have to resolve.
The most striking aspect of any prospective ruling is its legislative
character. This is the result of no precedent for such decisions. Even
though Linkletter established certain criteria which are supposed to
guide the Court, subsequent cases have shown that the process of re-
solving a prospectivity problem will be one of line drawing rather than
adherence to one uniform rule.
D. The "Deluge" and a "Wrong" 'without a Remedy
Although the effect of a retroactive rule on the administration of
justice has been the least persuasive of the three criteria established
by the Court, some authorities consider the basic reason behind a pro-
spective rule to be the prevention of an onslaught of petitions everytime
a new rule is handed down.2 2 Courts should not refuse retroactivity
merely because there is a chance that in the deluge a guilty man may
116The Supreme Court in Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968), noted that the
exclusionary rule of wiretap evidence stated in Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968),
hinted that the new rule may be partially retroactive. The Lee rule was held applicable
to evidence not sought to be introduced until after the new rule was laid down.
Therefore, it can be retroactive to certain conduct before Lee was decided.
17 See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 269 (1969) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
1S 396 U.S. 28 (1969).
"19 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
12o 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
121391 U.S. 194 (1968).
122 See Comment, Retroactivity of Constitutional Decisions, 44 N.C.L. REv. 1096, 1106
(1966); Comment, Retroactivity of Constitutional Decisions, 41 NOMRE DAmm LAw.
206, 213 (1965).
1970]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
go free."2 Fay v. Noia, the revolutionary case in the field of habeas
corpus, did not have a major disruptive effect on the courts.'24 Many
prisoners are prohibited from attacking their convictions collaterally
because they have served short terms or plead guilty. 5 Fay v. Noia
opened the gates to collateral attack for more prisoners, but decisions
such as Linkletter, Tehan, and Johnson, helped somewhat to shut
them.126 It is hard to comprehend how the public interest in stabilizing
judgments and not overcrowding dockets outweighs our time honored
ideal that no innocent man shall be convicted.2 7
An unfortunate aspect of any prospective ruling is that it leaves some
prisoners without a remedy for "wrongs" that can not be rectified
only because of the fortuitous circumstance that it occurred when it
did.'28 For example, Linkletter and Tehan were left without a remedy
for certain prejudicial conduct that was later held impermissible in
another case. On the other hand, pre-Wade victims of lineups without the
presence of counsel could take advantage of the due process test set
out in Stovall.'29 Similarly, prisoners whose trials had begun before
Escobedo or Miranda were decided could still take advantage of the
voluntariness test.130 In fact, the Court's explanation of such pre-Miranda
and pre-Escobedo relief questions the real need and possible validity of
the two decisions:
Thus while Escobedo and Miranda provide important newo safe-
guards against the use of unreliable statements at trial, the non-retro-
activity of these decisions will not preclude persons whose trials have
123See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 650 (Black, J., dissenting).
124 Id. at 652.
'25See Comment, Linkletter, Shott, and the Retroactivity Problem in Escobedo, 64
MicH. L. REv. 832; Schwartz, supra note 80, at 746.
126 See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 645 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 652-53.
128 See Johnson, supra note 71, at 1624.
129 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). The Supreme Court itself has used a due
process test to decide a pre-Wade case. See Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969).
130 Several interesting cases have come before the Court on different chronological
combinations of trial dates and the dates of Escobedo and Miranda. See, e.g., Jenkins
v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213 (1969) (Miranda not applicable on retrial where original
trial began before Miranda decided); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (trial
commenced after Escobedo, but before Miranda, therefore only Escobedo applicable).
The Supreme Court has on several occasions resorted to the voluntariness test in a
pre-Miranda case. Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967); Davis v. North Carolina,
384 U.S. 737 (1966).
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already been completed from invoking the same safeguards as part
of an involuntariness claim.'
The unjustified apprehension of a "deluge" of petitions and the in-
equity of a prospective rule that deprives a "similarly situated defend-
ant" of relief are two more manifestations of the quandary the Court
has created. If these were the only two difficulties encountered by the
Court, then a retroactive rule would be the remedy because court
dockets would not be overcrowded and all defendants would be able
to take advantage of the new "rule". However, the solution is not this
simple. The considerations discussed previously have shown the diffi-
culty that can be encountered with a pure retroactive rule in all cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
The problem of retroactivity and prospectivity has just begun to
plague not only the Supreme Court but all courts. Any rule that is
offensive to the least number of people while at the same time protec-
tive of the basic rights of a criminal defendant is most desirable. Neither
a purely prospective nor a completely retroactive ruling will provide
an adequate remedy. It is characteristic of the problem that any rule
will be a detriment to some group-the police, the courts, or the crim-
inal defendants. Careful consideration should be given to a ruling in all
cases and a uniform rule adopted. A "pick and choose" method as to
the rights to be accorded retroactive application and the defendants who
get the advantage to a new "rule" is contrary to the ideals of American
justice. More than ever the dictate of Justice Harlan is appropriate.
"'Retroactivity' must be rethought." 132
J.H.C.
131 Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 730 (1966) (emphasis added).
132 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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